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PROPOSED RELIABILITY COST-MODEL
SECTION I. INTRODUCTION
Asa prior condition to the logical development of any cost relationships,
it was found necessary in the case of reliability to strive for a clearer under-
standing of the means needed to establish and/or enhance reliability for a
system or subsystem. All of these things, collectively, will provide Reliability
Assurance. Many of these items may not be directly involved in a reliability
program, although their contributions (or lack of it) will clearly affect
reliability; e.g., Quality Control.
A. Subsets of Reliability Assurance
As noted above, the need was recognized for a better understanding of
the various subelements of Reliability Assurance. A Reliability Assurance
tree diagram, Figure 1, has been constructed to provide better visibility of
five categories of Reliability Assurance. An attempt has been made to provide
an exhaustive set of factors under each category, each of which contributes in
some degree to the assurance of reliability. Some of these elements lend them-
selves more readily to quantification than others in any attempt to establish
specific contributions to the overall system reliability, and/or to a specific
subsystem. Within this context, the terms "Hard" or "Soft" have been used
to estimate the degree of difficulty in establishing a direct link with reliability
cost values. For example, the introduction of "High Reliability" parts into a
design which formerly had utilized commercial grade parts will generally
provide a predictable increase in reliability (hard). On the other hand, the
introduction of increased spending in the area of manned flight awareness
could hardly be expected to provide a discrete increase in the reliability esti-
mate, and for this reason is termed soft. In order to provide further visibility
concerning the potential contributions of the subcategories shown in Figure 1,
a systems analysis matrix was used (see Appendix C), to indicate applicability
of the various subcategories versus hardware subsystems. Also, a systems
analysis matrix was used in Appendix D to play the same subcategories of
Reliability Assurance against the various hardware subsystems (hard or soft
measurable effects on Reliability Assurance). In both of these items we can
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observe that a desire to increase or decrease reliability is not a simple
matter of spending more or less funds, and/or allocation of lesser or greater
portions of the available resources. The establishment of reliability estimates
is both complex and heterogenous. Approaches that are effective for electronic/
electrical components and subsystems may either not be suitable for mechanical
systems, or just simply not available as an alternative. Consequently, ap-
proaches for reliability improvement have been categorized in the trade by the
type of hardware subsystem.
B. Cost-Estimating Definitions of Reliability
For similar reasons the development of cost-estimating relationships
(CER) may be observed to be structured by hardware subsystem reliability
versus cost (see Figure 2).
In order to complete this milieu for reliability cost sensitivity, another
parametric aspect should be considered. This parameter might be termed
design configuration type (DCT). A graphical illustration of this type of
variability may be seen in Figure 2. One of the curves illustrates the cost
sensitivity of an EOS type spacecraft to reliability, and the other curve indi-
cates the reliability versus cost factors for a COMSAT-type spacecraft.
Different ground rules, assumptions, and/or variations in technical/mission
requirements could account for such differences in variability and cost sensi-
tivity between these two sample design configurations. Further research and
data expansion will be necessary in order to include this source of variability
with the other factor in structuring a final master function which could be used
to explain an overall reliability cost-model. A more detailed account of the
interrelationships of the cost estimating activities will be given below as a part
of the proposed model description.
Based on the information displayed in Figure 1, as well as Appendices
|_B and C, the primary system elements for which CER's can be established for
reliability assurance will be the hardware subsystems. Typical subsystems
may be: Electrical, Mechanical, Attitude/Guidance Control, Structural, etc.
If an adequate data base is obtained from aerospace firms such as Boeing,
[^Lockheed, McDonnell-Douglas, etc., then the next lower_level of CER's could
be developed to depict the cost variation of reliability for the functional cate-
gories shown in Figure 1. The previously discussed aspects of "applicability"
and "quantifiability" must be considered in this review. At this time it does
not appear feasible to include the "Motivation" category as suitable for CER
development. For this reason, subsequent illustrative examples will not in-
clude motivation as a viable CER candidate.
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C. Variations in Cost Collection Modes
During the course of this study it has been recognized that instead of
there being only a single approach to relating cost to reliability in CER's,
there may be two or more modes which are feasible. Several of these possible
strategies, will be discussed below to provide a better understanding of the
complexities involved.
1. Subsystem unit cost versus reliability estimate values. This type
CER relates the subsystem total cost to variations in subsystem
reliability estimates;
2. Reliability peculiar costs for a subsystem versus variations in the
reliability estimate;
3. Total system unit cost versus reliability estimate values for the
total system; and
4. Total program costs per unit versus variations in the reliability
estimate. This type of cost value includes not only the direct
reliability-related costs, and hardware costs; but also management,
burden, and other administrative-type costs.
Each of the above modes explains the cost variability of reliability in a
slightly different way. Depending on the objectives of a particular model, one,
all, or additional CER's may be desirable.
SECTION 11. OBJECTIVES/STATEMENT OF PROBLEM
A. Objectives
Questions have frequently been raised concerning the marginal cost of
reliability. Stated differently, a question might logically be: "How much will
it cost to increase the reliability estimate of system X from, say, 95 percent
to 97 percent, or even 99 percent ?"G As discussed above, it can be readily
seen that such complex objectives are very difficult to implement. There may
be several alternative approaches to reliability improvement, as well as sev-
eral candidate subsystems which may have the capability to accept part, or all,
of the allocated increase in reliability performance. The same consideration
would also have to be given to an allocated decrease in a reliability estimate
since the allocation would have to be distributed among suitable subsystem
candidates, in. order to optimize cost-effectiveness within the system as a
whole. Any change in reliability requirements may be introduced either from
the bottom up, or from the top down, depending on how a change in require-
ments is specified. Consideration must be given to the subsystem that offers
the best opportunity for improvement or trade-offs. In certain electrical, or
electronic subsystems, the mere substitution of components could effect a
significant change in subsystem or system reliability, with their associated
cost elements.
Another starting point in a Reliability System Analysis could be a condi-
tion requiring a reduction in cost. This might involve use of the unique capa-
bilities of the Space Shuttle/Tug for the maintenance and refurbishment of
spacecraft systems. With the assumption of such capabilities, requirements
for high reliabilities and excessively long life cycles could be relaxed, with an
accompanying reduction in reliability and program costs.
Briefly stated, the objectives of a Reliability Cost-Model might be one,
or all, of the following:
1. Provide a means to forecast effects on the reliability of the overall
system, based on changes in one or more of the reliability-cost
relationships of the several subsystems.
2. Provide a means to allocate programmed increases or decreases
in the cost-reliability function (whole system) downward to the
several relevant subsystems.
3. Provide a system methodology to permit evaluation of the cost
effectiveness of alternative system configurations and/or program
operating plans (trade studies, etc.).
B. Statement of Problem
In full consideration of previously stated background information, there
exists a need both in the aerospace industry and in other industries, for a
methodology which will permit decision-making for reliability/cost considera-
tions to be made based on quantitative relationships. Such a methodology tool
has been termed a "Proposed Reliability Cost-Model", because the development
of an operational cost model to explain reliability is unquestionably outside of
the scope of the meager resource allocated to this effort.
Based on these considerations a more specific statement of the problem
for this study effort would be to generate, or structure, the framework for a
Reliability Cost-Model. This smaller and optimistically more-manageable
goal for a single investigator still represents a formidable obstacle, since, in
spite of the fact that the need has been recognized for some time, proposed
solutions or methodology are virtually non-existant.
C. Approach
Based on discussions of the objectives and the statement of the problem,
structuring of a Reliability Cost-Model framework will, of necessity, be
tempered by those considerations. At this point we are more interested in
establishing methodology that can be shown to service the practical needs of
cost modeling and/or iterations of alternative trade-offs of system parameters.
Feasibility of any proposed model should be demonstrated first, before any
subsequent effort is made to construct automated computerized versions of the
model algorithm. This approach to model development might be termed a
"stepping-stone" approach, with the distinct rationale being that low-cost
approaches for space programs should also be cost-effective. Hand solutions
of sample problem applications should be made first to demonstrate feasibility.
If the demonstrated methodology shows promise, then more sophisticated
solution-methods involving computer programs could be a next logical step.
The initial step approach for this study will be based on a non-automated
| cost-model framework. The general approach will consist of the mathematical
integration of a set of subsystem cost-estimating relationships (CER's) to form
a single master function which can be used to explain the overall cost varia-
bility (of reliability) for the overall system. In other words, the cost variabi-
lity for reliability of the several subsystems will be embedded mathematically
into a single cost figure-of-merit/reliability master function. Further descrip-
tive details of the model-building method will be given in Section IV.
SECTION III. ASSUMPTIONS, GROUND RULES,
AND CONSTRAINTS
A. Assumptions
Assumptions are based on previous descriptive information concerning
the logic, rationale, and goals for the proposed model framework. They will
include consideration of all these prior aspects and are listed as follows:
1. Cost-Estimating Relationships (CERs) can be formulated based
both on historical data obtainable primarily from one or more of
the larger aerospace contractors, or from certain internal govern-
ment sources.
2. Certain Cost Trade Relationships (CTRs) may also be needed to
establish sufficiency for utilization of the cost models.
3. To prevent possible misinterpretation of sample information it will
be assumed that hardware relative cost values are based on first
unit costs, with no learning, progress, or improvement aspects
implied.
4. Information implied or shown as CERs or CTRs should be utilized
primarily as planning or forecasting tools, and not in detail cost
estimating.
5. Inflation and/or changes in productivity should normally not be
considered as sources of variability in the sample cost information.
B. Ground Rules and Constraints
1. Cost values, CERs, CTRs, and/or other mathematical functions
displayed in this document are for informational uses only, and
should not be used for any other purpose. (This is not a working
model.)
2. The cost elements utilized in the sample model are either relative
cost values, or cost figure-of-merit type values which result from
a mathematical embedding process to integrate the cost sensitivities
(for reliability) of the selected set of subsystems.
3. No attempt has been made to isolate, or even to separate, the
"reliability unique or peculiar" costs from other system cost ele-
ments, so far as this initial reliability cost-model format is
concerned. (The next lower level of cost elements would presum-
ably involve such information.)
4. The prototype model described in Section IV is limited to the sub-
system level, based primarily on the lack of sufficient quality and
quantity of data for the lower levels displayed in Figure 1.
SECTION IV. DESCRIPTION OF A
PROPOSED MODEL FORMAT
A. Background
The approaches utilized in this model building exercise have employed
support from a sizeable group of engineering, management, statistics, mathe-
matics, and econometric disciplines. The unique aspect perhaps being that the
as-built model configuration does not rely, to any great extent, on any one of
these discipline areas as a prime theoretical source. The general approach is
based primarily upon a systems engineering methodology, since the principal
aspect being exercised in the proposed model (Reliability) has been termed a
systems specialty factor. Systems specialty factors in general specify or
define the degree of engineering confidence or assurance, that a particular
system will perform when compared or referenced to its established require-
ments (mission, cost, technical, etc.).
Quite often, in the past, questions have been posed in management
meetings which might take form in the following alternative ways:
1. If a reduction in program funding should occur, with a corre-
sponding reduction in reliability assurance allocation, how shall
this reduction in resources be dispersed among the several sub-
systems to minimize impact?
2. Given a reduction in resource allocation to a specific subsystem,
how shall this reduced support be subdivided among the various
affected subdisciplines; e.g., design inputs, analysis, testing, etc.?
3. If there is an urgent need to upgrade or increase overall program
reliability, to satisfy a national or international requirement (e.g.,
increase reliability of unmanned space launches to reduce possible
embarrassing launch failure of NATO satellite using U.S. launch
vehicle such as DELTA), how can reliability of system be increased
most economically, and how shall proposed increase be allocated
among several subsystem candidates ?
This group of questions is not intended to be exhaustive, and should only
be considered as typical. The intent here is to illustrate the fact that such ques-
tions are natural in decision-making environments involving top management.
If such questions are not unexpected, can a quantitative basis be established for
decision-making? It is fully realized that historically most decisions of this
type have had to be made with little or no precision, or even methodology.
Hopefully, the following information may provide a first step toward the fulfill-
ment of these needs.
B. Model Requirements
Requirements for the proposed model framework have already been at
least partially introduced by the set of questions outlined in the previous
section. What should be recognized, however, is that the stated requirements
must be considered preliminary until some experience is gained with the
approaches outlined, and the availability of necessary data has been assured.
1. The model should provide a tool for planners and top management
for consideration of the interplay between reliability requirements
and resource allocation.
2. The model should permit approximate subsystem reliability versus
cost estimates or forecasts.
3. The model should be sufficiently simple in format such that infor-
mation necessary to iterate the model can be displayed either in
the form of a table of parametric cost versus reliability values, or
characteristic curves displaying the same information.
4. The model should embody a systems engineering methodology which
will integrate the cost versus reliability sensitivities of the set of
subsystems which are designated as representative of the overall
system. This information shall also be either displayed in tabular
form, or by a master functional characteristic curve. The master
function will be comprised of reliability estimates versus cost
figure-of-merit values representative of the whole system.
5. The model will be constructed such that the range of useful appli-
cations may be specified by the user for each technical system to
which this approach is applied. A typical range could be, for
example, between reliability estimates of 90 percent to 97 percent.
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C. Model Format Description
As previously noted, the intent is not to attempt to provide a detail
working model but rather a set of descriptors which indicate the approach.
The reader, therefore, should focus his attention on the methodology and not
on the specific numbers and/or estimating relationships, which are included
primarily as illustrations. The layman or practitioner wishing to utilize a "
model of this type should establish his own CERs based on his own unique set
of technical reliability and cost experiences. The examples shown in Figure
2 illustrate two CERs based on relative, rather than actual, cost values.
The curves of Figure 2 represent basically two types of spacecraft design
configurations that could represent a wide range of cost-to-reliability sensi-
tivity. Both of these curves represent data reported by aerospace researchers,
and indicate possible cost-estimating relationships for a typical electrical sub-
system. As might be expected, the relative cost values increase slowly at first,
for small increases in reliability. After a certain point has been met, the
relative cost values start to increase at a more rapid rate for each additional
increase in reliability requirements. This same diminishing return type of
response function is also typical for many other physical and/or socio-economic
activities; e.g., learning curves, material quantity discount cost functions,
organization and/or discipline progress functions, etc.
The approach suggested here is based on the utilization of a set of
subsystem CERs with each cost-sensitive system; e.g., electrical subsystem,
mechanical subsystems, etc. The selection of a suitable set is up to the
',decision-maker or analyst as long as the overall model constraints and require-
ments are met, and the following list of special constraints:
1. Each of the subsystem CERs used to comprise the system set must
be either monotonically increasing, or decreasing, but in the same
direction.
2. For the benefit of clarity, all functional plots comprising the
established system set (ESS), will be plotted on the same type of
coordinates; e.g., Cartesian, log-log, semi-log, etc.
3. All diophantine cuts will be linear, and for each model will be
either parallel to the ordinate, or the abscissa axis.
4. If subsystem functions are such that cuts might intersect the
function more than once, the intersection points for the higher
reliability values will be posted.
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5. Initially, cuts will be made at regular intervals; e.g., 10 percent,
20 percent, 30 percent, etc., but more frequent cuts may be
needed for those portions of the CER curves that indicate very
rapid rate of change.
6. To simplify arithmetic computations all values from cutting plane
samples will be converted to natural logarithms, and then entered
in tabular form into a matrix.
Finally, having observed the above constraints, the log values from
the matrix table may be plotted to form a characteristic Reliability Assurance
master function as indicated in Figure 3. This function was generated in the
same manner as described above. In essence, the framework for a Reliability-
Cost Model has been established, thus making it possible to propose various
re] lability/relative-cost trades.
Mathematically speaking, the model bears resemblance to models
described elsewhere — such as the multiplicative model described by Benjamin
[ l], or the log-normal by Chow [2 ] , or the similitude models by Gukhman [4] ,
et al. There is a common thread through all of the examples cited: the com-
monality being that a series of parameters (or factors) can be used to explain
an overall system effect or cumulative resultant, provided the parametric
values are multiplied together, or added geometrically by summing the loga-
rithms of the numbers rather than the discrete numerical values themselves.
The application of these concepts may be extended to include variates which
are either discrete or continuous, dependent or independent. The multiplica-
tive format tends to embed each of the participating variates, one with the
other. The embedding process tends to minimize unknown or indeterminate
interaction or internal influence effects between the various subelements of the .
ESS. So, if we let Q = cost figure-of-merit for the ESS, Y = relative cost of
various factors and,
Q = Yr Y2 . . . Yn (1)
by taking the natural logarithm of both sides of the equation, the following
expression results:
12
O
o
d
w
coa
1
•s
0)
£?
«M
-4->to
o
o
to
OT
>
^
s
I-H
0)
CO
1I3MW JO 3MH9U - 1SOO
13
or
1 Q = 1 Y + 1 Y + ... 1 Y ... (3)
n n 1 n 2 n n v /
If, for example, the individual values of Y represent functions of subsystems
(CERs) as we have above, and if we take the geometric sum of these subsystem
functions, then the resulting curve should assume a geometrical shape which
approximates the shape of the individual elements. For the conditions existing
in the reliability CERs, the subsystem functions are approximately exponential.
Therefore, it is not surprising that the master function (see Figure 3) also
assumes an approximate exponential shape. As such, this master function
is a characteristic function representing the expected reliability/cost perform-
ance for the whole system. There appears to be no definite limit on the number
of subelements which are included in the ESS. If the master function values
are normally distributed (log Q) as indicated by Chow, then Q would be loga-
6
rithmico-normally distributed, based on argument of Central Limit Theorem.
Also, a closely related concept is involved in the understanding of the network
— the model is also related to the Law of Large Numbers [7]. Agreement
with a certain reliability estimate, or failure rate could be made arbitrarily
close to some predetermined value by making "n" sufficiently large.
The mechanics of the subject model framework does not resemble any
of these to any significant degree, since what is strived for in the model at
hand is an artificial population of reliability/economic indicators. A related
approach was used by the author in structuring a model for learning ts]. This
model does bear a strong methodological similarity, as well as a theoretical
commonality based on the aspect of complexity, which is the nemesis of both
reliability and learnability.
SECTION V. DISCUSSION
In the previous section the suggested model approach was described in
sufficient detail to permit a potential user to assemble his own model. The
level of detail, however, was not sufficient to permit a "cook-book" style
mimicry of the methodology. This was no oversight, since such procedures
are not in keeping with the intent of this document.
In the past, many questions have been raised concerning the relation-
ship of reliability with other systems engineering specialty factors such as
14
safety and quality. These disciplines both have many subelements which
either overlap, or have at least the common bond of purpose. In other words,
many of the things that are done in the name of quality, such as inspection,
and/or traceability also tend to provide a more reliable product. Similarily,
in the safety area, hazard analysis, or the requirement for fail-safe design
features, also tends to provide a product which is not only safer, but more
reliable. Indeed^ there are many instances where it is almost impossible to
separately classify a product improvement as being specifically for either
| quality, safety, or reliability, since, usually, an improvement involves all of
them. Recently, the term Product Assurance has been used to include the
effects of Safety Assurance, Reliability Assurance, and Quality Assurance. A
functional tree diagram (see Figure 4), has been included to indicate the re-
lationships of these three important specialty factors, as well as illustrate the
model-building approach for Reliability Assurance. Although not specifically
indicated in the diagram, a further expansion of the functional CER could be
made at the level indicated by such subcategories as test, design inputs, anal-
ysis, etc. Depending on the availability of data, and, of course, on the need,
this same approach could be continued to even the next lower level of detail.
For example, under the Test category we could track the influence of material
testing on the cost of reliability, or the relationship of systems check-out to
the cost of reliability improvements. If the same approach is maintained
1 throughout, it will be possible to assemble a compatible set bf influence factors,
each of which will explain some factor, or subfactor, or sub-subfactor of the
cost sensitivities in Reliability Assurance. Eventually, a computerized version
of the model can be assembled with no extreme difficulty. This would apply not
only to the particular problem at hand (Reliability Assurance), but also for the
higher level Product Assurance model. Premature attempts to computerize
these models before they are definitized and operational, can only lead to a
waste of resources.
Recently, much attention has been given to a reliability-related term
called Man Rating. A particular reference was made to this aspect during a
meeting of a House Committee on Science and Astronautics, June 15-17, 1971
[5]. In this meeting the following statement was made relative to man-rating
costs, quote: "For example, the cost of a Titan II, modified for Gemini,
including the addition of redundant flight control systems and man rating,
increased from $5 million for a standard vehicle to an average of $23 million".
A public relations handout [6] entitled "Man-rating the Gemini Launch Vehicle"
characterized man-rating as "... an awesome task, requiring the support and
contributions of personnel in many specialties". The company attributed
involvement of personnel in practically all aspects of operations, logistics,
quality, manufacturing, test, and design as being involved in man rating. The
firm also listed a design configuration change in addition to redundancy,
namely the Malfunction Detection System (MDS).
15
1°
co z
co 3
< u.
o
cc
o.
M
>=! K
CC :
I ^
Ii-> CO
r~ ^
UJ <
U. CC
CO CO
CO
4'
a s
?!
« £ " ill P
«
s
 o& iI? i-i E
>•
3
5S
< uj
K h-
,7 =
(J
Lli
yf«
o «35
UJ CO
S S 5
cc zO HIB
to «2
Q
glr
Y<t
IB C 7
• • •
tn
>
ubciz
Zio(S H
S5 =
UJ iQ z
cona
CQ
as
»— 4
CD
•8
I
•4-J
W
O
O
.§>
16
One of the key aspects stressed in the discussion of the MDS is the
feature that, based on the information provided by the special Malfunction
Display Panel, made it possible for crew members to become in reality a part
of the "loop". They could use such information in deciding whether to abort
all, or part, of the mission in the interest of personal safety, or to prevent
possible damage to the equipment. Its contribution to the Increase in cost no
doubt was sizeable, but the recognized increase In overall Product Assurance
could justify the addition of such a system to the design configuration. As may
be observed by reference to the points made above and also to other sources,
man rating is a rather loose term which is defined in several ways, and can
mean many different things to different people. (See Glossary for comparison),
Without resorting to a detailed cost-effectiveness analysis, it is perhaps'per'-
missible to comment that sometimes quite sizeable increases in the cost of
Reliability and/or Product Assurance might eventually become quite reasonable
when compared with the potential failure of a major space venture.
SECTION VI. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
A. Conclusions
1. The use of CERs as a tool in estimating iterative trade-offs of
various system specialty factor values versus system costs is a
necessary approach.
2. The necessary CERs can be established, provided sufficient data
is made available to build these functions.
3. Assuming the above conclusions can be fulfilled, it should be
possible to subsequently build system-oriented Reliability Cost-
Models.
4. Such models should permit management executives, analysts, et
al, to forecast the change in reliability estimates by variations in
the volume of resources allocated to reliability. Another way of
saying this would be: Model users should be able to predict the
marginal effect on the reliability of a system from either increases
or decreases in the allocated resources.
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5. Although many strategies are available to the decision-maker
seeking to iterate the reliability of a system (see Figure l), those
approaches which lend themselves to discrete measurement should
be given priority over the soft or indirect methods.
6. Previous methodologies for making work breakdown structures
(WBS) do not readily lend themselves to generation of the needed
data to support the subject model. A WBS standard procedure is
urgently needed.
7. Irrespective of existing problems, the subject proposed model
format does satisfy the intent of the objectives as outlined in
Section II.
8. The relationships which are depicted graphically in Figure 4 indicate
the flexibility and universality of the model concepts described
herein and also in a previously published dissertation on applied
learning theory [3].
9. The expansion of the model concepts to include the higher level
systems specialty factor of Product Assurance appears to be a
logical next stop. Prediction models for other systems specialty
factors appear to be completely feasible.
10. At present there are no known technical reasons to prevent an
operational Reliability Cost-Model from being assembled.
11. Problems in systems engineering have occurred in the past and
will presumably continue because of a tendancy to view systems
specialty factors in a non-hierarchial and/or synecdochical
manner. System elements which are subordinate to other elements
are frequently treated as equal, or superior, to such items.
Quite frequently also, an approach is taken whereby the natural
overlap between Safety, Reliability, and Quality Assurance is
not recognized as such (See Figure 5).
12. The modeling concepts outlined herein and in Reference 3 provide
a response to the subject modeling problem, but, more importantly,
also show the way to a family of models having a broad and general-
ized scope of application. Practical applications of these models
should be both simplistic and cost-effective, because hand solutions
can generally be used efficiently. Computerization is possible, but
not essential, for most situations.
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NOTE; DIAGRAM N.T0S0, DIMENSIONS ARE FOR
ILLUSTRATIVE PURPOSES ONLY,
Figure 5. Product Assurance Venn diagram.
B. Recommendations
1. A follow-on effort should be initiated to assemble a demonstrational
Reliability Cost-Model based on the information and guidelines
presented in this document.
2. Another follow-on project is suggested to define the model-elements
for a Product Assurance Cost-Model as suggested in previous
sections.
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3. Further study should be initiated to define the necessary and
sufficient criteria for the Completely Generalized Model, as out-
lined briefly above. The applicability of this proposed model would
be extendable to virtually all areas of parameter/factor analysis.
4. Also, an activity should be initiated to formulate an algorithm/
procedure for WBS, since relevant cost-experience data cannot be
recorded without a logical cost structure.
5. Consideration should be given to the proposition of a pilot project
involving hardware, which would permit iterations of reliability
cost-parameters under closely controlled conditions.
6. A companion effort should be generated to collect the necessary
cost data to build CERs for the demonstrational model.
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APPENDIX A
GLOSSARY OF KEY TERMS
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1. CER — This acronym represents the words Cost Estimating
Relationship( s). CERs are usually displayed as functional curves
(see Figure 2), although a tabular format may be utilized. In
either case, cost is referenced to some system performance/
design parameters, or system specialty factors, such as weight,
power, volume, thrust, impulse, reliability, durability, maintain-
ability, etc. Such functions are used in making estimates, fore-
casts, predictions and the like, but are not usually considered
precision measures of either. CERs are not recent inovations,
since cost estimating relations based primarily on weight have
existed for many years. Volume and power were also used to a
somewhat lesser extent.
2. Complexity Function (CF) — This term refers to approximate
relations, emperically relating complexity to some other para-
meter, such as cost or reliability. In general, such functions de-
pict reliability decreasing, and cost increasing as the complexity
of a system or design increases.
3. Cost Figure-of-Merit (CFOM) — This term represents a multi-
plicative parametric value which is created by adding the logarithms
of the various cuts taken from each of the selected CERs in the
Established System Set (ESS). Since each group of cuts for the ESS
is made at a specific reliability value, it is therefore possible to
plot CFOM against reliability and thus create an overall or master
cost function for the system. An illustrative example of such a
function is shown in Figure 3,
4. CTR — This acronym represents the words Cost Trade Relation-
ship^). CTRs are usually displayed as functional curves, although
the information may also be presented in a tabular format. As
implied, the CTR is used generally as a tool in making trade
studies. Such factors as power requirements, R and D cost, weight,
volume, etc., are used to generate CTRs such that technical re-
quirements and/or mission objectives can be optimized, or at
least logically specified in systems planning exercises. A typical
approach would be to relate weight, volume, or power for a sub-
system versus the performance of the subsystem or system in
order to select a cost-effective combination of design criteria.
CTRs are frequently used to provide inputs to the CERs.
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5. Design Complexity (DC) — This form of complexity has to do
with features or parameters of an engineering design which contri-
bute to its complexity. Examples of such features which tend to
increase the measure of design complexity are such aspects as
total number of parts, number of fasteners, or number of sub-
assemblies. Others might be the number of different steps or
processes required to fabricate, assemble, and inspect.
6. Design Configuration Type (DCT) — A Design Configuration Type
is a term used to designate a category or generic class of system
configurations for which both the technical and cost parameters
could be expected to be typical. When estimating costs of large
systems, example DCTs would be solid propellant boosters,
nuclear-powered submarines, army tanks, or jet airliners. Such
examples represent rather distinct examples of large system types,
each of which is made up of a unique set of subsystems and hardware
components.
7. Established System Set (ESS) — This term refers to a group or set
of cost sensitive subsystem CERs which has been selected as
representative of the overall system (Design Configuration Type,
DCT). Each cost model will have a characteristic ESS, depending
not only on the unique set of subsystems involved, but also on the
type of design configuration involved; e.g., electronic, mechanical,
power supply, etc.
A typical ESS might be a group of CERs for the following:
electrical power, mechanical guidance and control, and environ-
mental control subsystems.
8. Factor — This term can be considered a synonym of parameter as
far as this research is concerned.
9. Figure of Merit (FOM) — This term can be considered a numerical
performance rating which is a measure of the relative performance
of a system or design. Term is usually dimensionless or is con-
sidered so in its applications to decision theory.
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10. Learning Curve (LC) — A learning curve is a graphical plot on
either Cartesian or on double logarithmic paper, which represents
the rate of learning progress by humans, usually in performance
of some task or group of tasks. In the engineering discipline this
plot is usually made with time as the ordinate parameter, and
number of units complete or simply number of units as the abscissa.
In general, these curves will aproximate an exponential-shaped
function, if the progress is normal. This function should be sep-
arated from progress and improvement functions by the fact that
only human learning progress is to be included in a learning
curve; not tooling, design, or other gains in performance, which
may be a part of progress or improvement functions.
11. Log-Linear — This term is often used to describe learning curves
which are plotted on double-logarithmic paper. In general, such
curves will appear as straight lines. This greatly simplifies
computation of the slope, and will, of course, make these curves
easier to plot.
12. Man Rating — Man Rating is defined as the philosophy and plan
for marshalling the disciplines necessary to achieve a satisfactory
probability of crew survival. It can be seen that achieving a
satisfactory level of crew survival requires that careful consider-
ation be given to such launch vehicle items as:
1. Component and/or system redundancy, which can improve
the reliability of the launch vehicle.
2. Analysis of launch vehicle modes, followed by design of a
reliable Malfunction Detection System.
3. Functional utilization of the crew as part of the Malfunction
Detection System.
4. Tradeoffs in checkout philosophy, with emphasis on mini-
mizing the probability of launching a bad vehicle.
5. Test, countdown, and launch procedures that will maximize
launching a good vehicle.
6. Tradeoffs of system complexity versus reliability.
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Man Rating requires the very best in engineering, manufacturing,
test and quality control, as well as in the supporting procurement,
logistics, planning, configuration control, and general manage-
ment functions. Enforcement of rigid disciplines every step of
the way from program inception to liftoff is mandatory.
Man Rating is a many-sided process of improving the reliability
of the basic vehicle, by modifying existing systems, by using
redundant components, adding special systems for crew safety
purposes, special handling of critical components, meticulous
selection of qualified people, and by developing procedures in the
entire design-production-manufacturing-test-launch cycle that
establishes, as a goal, flawless performance from the launch
vehicle.
13. Maturation — This term refers to the sub-set of improvement or
progress factors which relate to the segment of progress by indi-
viduals or other organisms that results from a time-related
maturing or growing-up process. Maturation is not considered a
normal part of learning progress.
14. Model — A Model is an approximation of reality which is frequently
used to forecast or predict performance approximations of real
world situations. Models may be physical or analytical within
this context. Analytical models are sometimes referred to as
math models, or as algorithms, which consist of a necessary
and sufficient set of terms, values, and formuli needed to com-
pute or predict an output value based on a known input or set of
/ input values and recognized constraints or limitations.
15. Monotonic Function — This term is used to designate a mathemat-
ical function, either theoretical or empirical, which has single
maximum and minimum points. If the function is an increasing
function, it would be referred to as a monotonic increasing func-
tion and conversely a monotonic decreasing function. Learning
curves are normally monotonic-decreasing-functions over time.
16. Parameter — For purposes of this study, the terms factor, design
feature, or parameter may be used interchangeably. A Parameter
is a term which is used to measure or gauge some feature or
physical characteristic of a system or design. This measure is
usually defined in some unit which is officially accepted, such as
weight in grams or volume in cubic feet, etc.
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17. Product Assurance (PA) — Product Assurance is a system
specialty factor which combines several of the subfactors such as
Reliability Assurance, Quality Assurance, and Safety Assurance.
PA includes all activities which directly or indirectly support or
increase the likelihood that a product or system will perform its
intended function in accordance with established criteria, stand-
ards, specifications, or other requirements.
18. Quality Assurance (QA) — This systems specialty factor includes
all those activities which may quantify the degree or increase the
likelihood that a system or product will be produced and delivered
such that adherence to the established criteria, standards, speci-
fications, or other requirements will be optimum.
Typical examples of Quality Assurance activities include inspec-
tion, qualification and durability tests, subsystem and system
functional checkout, acceptance testing and statistical sampling
plans.
19. Reinforcement — This term frequently appears in psychological
journals and is used to infer that anything which tends to help a
person to recall from memory or to accelerate the learning
process, is considered a reinforcement. Sometimes reinforce-
ments may be considered as positive or negative depending on the
purpose or objective. One form of reinforcement would be to
repeat a rule to a group of army recruits to assure a transfer to
memory. A memorized poem may be repeated over several times
by a student to reinforce the memorization of this passage.
20. Reliability Assurance (RA) — This systems specialty factor
includes all those activities which quantify or increase the likehood
that a product or system will perform it's intended function(s)
when called on to do so. This performance must be within the
established criteria, specification, or other requirement limits,
either at a discrete point in time; e.g., rocket engine ignition, or
for specified time intervals as posted in the requirements.
21. Safety Assurance (SA) — This systems specialty factor includes
all those activities which may quantify the degree or increase the
likelihood that a person, system, or product will perform the
intended function(s) in such a manner that no unplanned activity
or condition will cause damage, destroy, or otherwise incur harm
to equipment, facilities, or persons.
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22. System — A System is a planned, integrated assembly or group-
ing as hardware, software, and/or human elements which function,
as a unit to produce some specific or unique desired effect or
result. A subsystem is subordinate to a system, but must meet
the same definition criteria.
23. Systems Engineering (SE) — The discipline in which engineering
principles are used to plan, group, design, integrate, coordinate,
specify, analyze or otherwise bring together all of the elements
or component parts of a system such that each element operates
in unison with all other elements of the system to produce a pre-
dictable and desired effect or output when operating in a specified
environment.
24. System Specialty Parameters (SSP) — Expressions of system
performance variables or characteristics concerned with the
overall technical effectiveness of an integrated system. System
specialty parameters are used in system modeling, system trade
studies, technical performance measurements, and assessments.
Typical examples of specialty parameters are reliability, availa-
bility, maintainability, safety, survivability, etc.
25. Time Series — This well-known statistical analysis technique
employs an artificial parameter (called Time Series) which is
created from selected subfactors additively or by a multiplicative
process. This macrovariable, when plotted over time, produces
a trend line which is one basis for forecast or predictions of fu-
ture performance.
26. Weighting Coefficients — These values are usually expressed in
fractional parts and are used to transfer the desired emphasis to
alternative performance ratings or estimates of value. The sum
of such weights must always equal 1; if whole numbers are pre-
ferred the sum must equal 10. If there is no particular emphasis
desired by the decision maker, then each alternative will receive
an implied weight of one.
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APPENDIX B
RELIABILITY COST-MODEL SYSTEMS ANALYSIS
(APPLICABILITY)
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